I. Introduction
In 2010, for the first time in over forty years, Wisconsin voters elected a Republican majority in both state houses as well as a Republican governor. 1 Seeking to redraw voting districts in the wake of the 2010 census, Republican leadership hired a law firm and a political science professor who created a regression model that isolated "the baseline partisanship of a unit of geography." 2 In conjunction with redistricting software, the regression model allowed lawmakers to explore potential districting decisions based on partisan result. 3 [Y]ou would open up a plan that you'd been working on or label a new plan and assign it to the Assembly district that you wanted to work with and then you could also pick a color that you wanted that Assembly district to be. It's sort of a color-bynumber exercise… 4 In addition to data showing the number of people in a district, minority group populations, and voting-age populations, the software also allowed Republican legislators to customize redistricting maps with ease. 5 Republican staff and legal counsel created customized demographic data that generated a composite partisan score reflecting the political make-up of discrete population units. 6 This composite partisan score enabled aggregation of those units into new districts that revealed the partisan make-up of the new districts. 7 Republican staff members then drafted several statewide maps. 8 The drafters considered traditional districting criteria like compactness and communities of interest. 9 The drafters also used the composite partisan score to assess the level of partisan advantage in each potential map. 10 The drafters met with individual Republican incumbents to verify addresses and solicit redistricting preferences, asking "are there areas you like, are there areas that you don't like, are there areas surrounding your district that you like?" Id. at 846-47. 3 Id. at 846-52. 4 Id. at 847-48. 5 Id. at 848. 6 Id.
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Id.
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Id. at 849-50. 9 Id. at 844, 863 (articulating the defendants' argument as "Act 43's districts were congruent, compact, and fairly equal in population"). 10 Id. at 848-49. 11 Id. at 849, n.36. One senator suggested how to redraw her district to unseat a Over the course of several months, a variety of statewide alternative maps emerged, identified by the degree of pro-Republican advantage, ranging from "basic," to "assertive" to "aggressive." 12 The drafters then presented a selection of regional maps to Republican leadership along with the partisan scores for each. 13 Combining the regional maps chosen by Republican leadership, the drafters created the "final map." 14 In a separate document, labeled "Tale of the Tape," the drafters compared the partisan outcome of the proposed final map with the State's current map. 15 Under the State's current map, 49 of 99 seats were 50% or better for Republicans. 16 Under the proposed final map, 59% were 50% or better for Republicans. 17 Even so, the drafters again scrutinized the proposed final map for partisan performance, identifying and grouping districts into categories like "GOP seats strengthened a lot" and "GOP donors to the Team," the latter of which consisted of incumbents with numbers above 55% that donated "points" to weaker Republican districts. 18 Once finalized, each Republican legislator received data on his or her new district along with a memorandum detailing census numbers and a comparison of election contests in the new district compared to the old. 19 The memorandum excluded data about compactness, continuity, and non-partisan communities of interest. 20 When the drafters presented the finalized map at the Republican caucus, the drafters stated that "[t]he maps we pass will determine who's here 10 years from now." 21 Both houses voted for the redistricting maps, the Governor signed it, and the redistricting maps were published as Wisconsin Act 43 on August 23, 2011. 22 In 2012, the Republican Party garnered 48% of the statewide vote for Assembly candidates but captured 60.6% of the Assembly seats. 23 In 2014, the Republican Party garnered 52% of the statewide vote for Assembly candidates and won 63.6% of the Assembly seats. 24 In 2016, the Republican Party garnered 52% of the Democrat: "If you need a way to take the Staskunas seat, put a little bit of my Senate seat into New Berlin." Id.
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Id. at 853. 22 2011 Wis. Sess. Laws 708. 23 Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 853. 24 Id.
statewide vote for Assembly candidates and won 64.6% of the Assembly seats. 25 A three-judge federal court scrutinized these results and struck Wisconsin Act 43 as an unconstitutional gerrymander under both the First Amendment and the Equal Protection clause in November 2016. 26 After weeks of litigation, the court in Whitford v. Gill made a series of factual findings:
[T]he drafters sought to understand the partisan effects of the maps they were drawing. They designed a measure of partisanship and confirmed the accuracy of this measure with Professor Gaddie. They used this measure to evaluate regional and statewide maps that they drew. They labeled their maps by reference to their partisanship scores, they evaluated partisan outcomes of the maps, and they compared the partisanship scores and partisan outcomes of the various maps. When they completed a statewide map, they submitted it to Professor Gaddie to assess the fortitude of the partisan design in the wake of various electoral outcomes. 27 Notably, the court also cited evidence that the drafters intended to entrench Republican control for at least a decade -until the next census. 28 Even if statewide support for Republicans fell below 48%, the court found that Act 43 assured Republicans a "comfortable majority." 29 The court's decision in Whitford marks the first time a federal court has invalidated a redistricting plan as unconstitutional for partisan gerrymandering in over 30 years. 30 Wisconsin appealed to the Supreme Court, which recently granted review. 31 The Supreme Court has long held that extreme partisan gerrymandering violates equal protection, but it has simultaneously refused to act and instead labeled such claims nonjusticiable political questions that invite judicial entanglement into a "political thicket." 32 In particular, the Court has maintained that no judicially manageable standard yet exists by which the Court could 25 Wisconsin State Assembly Elections, 2016, BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/Wisconsin_State_Assembly_elections,_2016 (last visited July 14, 2017). 26 Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 837. 27 Id. at 895. 28 Id. 29 
Id.
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See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986) (agreeing that partisan gerrymandering was justiciable, but there was no majority agreement among the six justices regarding the applicable standard). implement the promise of equal protection to partisan redistricting. It will soon revisit that rationale. 33 This Article examines the Court's use of judicially manageable standards as a barrier to judicial action in partisan gerrymandering disputes. A review of the Court's historical use of the manageable standard requirement reveals the Court's unprincipled and discretionary implementation of it, and that the Court often reduces the manageability inquiry to a generalized cost-benefit analysis with judicial legitimacy on one end of the scale. As such, the manageable standard roadblock is properly seen as a deeper insecurity involving appropriateness of judicial review. It unearths Professor Bickel's perineal query regarding the proper role of the Court:
The search must be for a function…which is peculiarly suited to the capabilities of the courts; which will not likely be performed elsewhere if the courts do not assume it; which can be so exercised as to be acceptable in a society that generally shares Judge Hand's satisfaction in a "sense of common venture"; which will be effective when needed; and whose discharge by the courts will not lower the quality of the other departments' performance by denuding them of the dignity and burden of their own responsibility. 34 This Article does not attempt to answer that question globally, but argues that in the context of partisan redistricting, judicial intervention meets this standard. Court intervention to keep legislators from ensuring re-election comports with the structure of the constitution, itself predominantly dedicated to ensuring a representational democracy resistant to concentrated power in any one branch. Court intervention in partisan redistricting is also value neutral. In other words, a representation-reinforcing approach to judicial review avoids constitutionally enshrining the Court's personal value judgments and thereby avoids the criticism that non-elected, life-tenured judges override the value judgments made by elected representatives. Intervention to unblock the avenues of political change is one of the Court's central responsibilities. In similar contexts the Court has recognized as much and it should do so again in Whitford.
Part II surveys the trend toward increased and entrenched partisan gerrymandering as well as the resultant injuries visited on representational democracy. Part III reviews legislative unwillingness to self-correct and judicial abdication in partisan redistricting disputes through the political question doctrine. Part IV analyzes the Court's use of judicially manageable standards, attempting to discern how the Court determines when a standard is manageable. Part V argues that the manageable standard requirement is largely a question of judicial insecurity. Seen this way, the Court's refusal to engage in gerrymandering disputes cuts against recognized constitutional theory and the Court's own practice of intervening when the avenues of democratic representation have been obstructed by those in power. The Article concludes that the political question doctrine and the manageable standard requirement should not bar the Court from deciding the constitutionality of partisan gerrymandering claims.
II.
Non-Representative Democracy "In the 2016 elections for the House of Representatives, the average electoral margin of victory was 37.1%." 35 The winning candidate, whether Democrat or Republican, typically won by around 70% of the vote to the challenging party's 30% of the vote. Of 435 contests, a margin of 5% or less arose in only 17. 36 Of 435 contests, 33 were decided by a margin of 10% or less. "In other words, more than 9 out of 10 House races were landslides where the campaign was a foregone conclusion before ballots were even cast." 37 One commentator noted that such landslide elections, insuring that those in power remain so, might be expected of autocratic nations that are democracies in name only. 38 In 46 To be sure, gerrymandering is not the sole cause of landslide elections that lack the possibility of competitiveness, but it is a significant influence.
Professor Stephanopoulos conducted a more direct study examining the effects of partisan districting on election outcomes. 47 The study included all states with at least eight congressional districts and all state house plans for all elections from 1972 to 2012. 48 Interestingly, the study revealed a relatively low rate of significant gerrymandering up until the 2012 election, when partisan gerrymandering spiked significantly. 49 The study's authors conclude that "today's most egregious plans dwarf those 40 Id. Id. at 836-37. 48 Id.
49
Id. at 867 (asserting that up until 2012 "neither party enjoyed a systematic advantage over its opponent").
of their predecessors," and assert that "the problem of gerrymandering has never been worse in American history." 50 Perhaps most telling, several polls show that Americans do not want legislators drawing electoral maps. In Virginia, for example, one study polled over 1,000 Virginians, with 74% supporting districting lines drawn by an independent board rather than state legislators. 51 Even constituents who benefited from gerrymandering rejected it. Of those identifying as Republicans, only 19% said they wanted lawmakers to define election districts. 52 The disapproval of partisan gerrymandering carried across age and racial groups. 53 Assuming such polls accurately reflect the electorate, the results illustrate gerrymandering's central dilemma: Those responsible for resisting it are those who most directly benefit from it.
Partisan gerrymandering benefits the legislators and parties drawing the district lines, but it carries a host of negative consequences for the electorate. Academic research into Congressional behavior yields at least one fixed finding; more than anything else, winning elections motivates politicians. 54 But if opposition is effectively neutralized, the negative consequences include less responsiveness, less accountability, less ideological diversity, less compromise, and less institutional legitimacy. 55 A legislator elected with a 40% margin harbors little incentive to compromise and is constrained, if at all, to represent only party constituents. 56 Indeed, a strong disincentive to compromise stems from the sole electoral vulnerability -the primary. 57 Id.
57
Klass, supra note 35 ("In fact, there is a strong disincentive to collaboration, because working across the aisle almost certainly means the risk of a primary challenge from the far right or far left of the party.").
becomes a contest of radicals. 58 The most extreme candidate often secures the party nomination, prompting incumbents to eschew any semblance of compromise or moderation while in office. 59 This, in turn, incites gridlock and obstruction exemplified, inter alia, in the shutdown of government, 60 pandering filibusters, 61 and the downgrading of the United State's debt rating. 62 Voter apathy and disillusionment with the institutions of government also attends gerrymandering. Voters respond and participate in close elections much more than in elections that appear predetermined. 63 Competitive races carry the secondary benefit of participation in other election matters on the same ballot, reflected most clearly in presidential election cycles. 64 Conversely, predetermined elections curry heightened incredulity in policymakers and governing institutions. 65 The public's faith in and goodwill towards governing institutions decreases with the public's diluted influence over them. 66 As such, gerrymandering has been called "the most insidious practice in American politics -a way…for our elected leaders to entrench themselves in 435 impregnable garrisons from which they can maintain political power while avoiding democratic realities. 70 The First Congress of our new nation suffered allegations of gerrymandering at the hands of Patrick Henry who reputedly attempted to manipulate voting districts to the detriment of James Madison. 71 It was not until 1812, however, that the eponymous Elbridge Gerry, the Massachusetts Governor, designed a district so grotesque and salamander-like as to coin the current locution. 72 As noted above, state legislators today continue to draw voting districts predominantly for partisan gain. 73 The current practice demonstrates increase rather than stagnation or decrease in the total number of gerrymandered districts as well as the degree of gerrymandered entrenchment. 74 With legislators unwilling to forbear, the possibility of reform has fallen to the judiciary. Court precedent as it now stands invites uncertainty. For the last thirty-one years, the Court has maintained that extreme partisan gerrymandering violates the equal protection clause while simultaneously refusing to show when or how it violates the equal protection clause. 75 Instead, a plurality of the Court insists the judiciary lacks the ability to show when partisan gerrymandering violates the equal protection clause. 76 The Court's reticence to articulate a legal standard interpreting open-ended constitutional guarantees like equal protection is not new.
That reticence prevented Court intervention into political districting in Colgrove v. Green in 1946. 77 Population shifts generated material disproportionalities based on outdated districts, handing rural voters a lopsided share of the vote. 78 The Court refused to intervene, maintaining that it was powerless to do so because the Constitution specifically entrusted Congress with ensuring a "Republican Form of Government" 79 and with ensuring fair elections: "[T]he Constitution…conferred upon Congress exclusive authority to secure fair representation." 80 This judicial abstention from redistricting lasted sixteen years.
The Warren Court in 1962 reversed the effect of Colgrove without technically overruling it when the Warren Court declared redistricting justiciable under the Fourteenth Amendment rather than the Guarantee Clause. 81 In Baker v. Carr, and in a series of subsequent decisions dealing with disproportionate voting districts, the Court cemented its authority to adjudicate the constitutionality of a wide variety of districting disputes. 82 The Court held that the equal protection clause demanded "no less than substantially equal state legislative representation for all citizens..." 83 and extended its newly articulated standard of "one person, 74 See Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 33, at 867-76. 75 See Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 111. 
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Colgrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 553-54 (1946) ("It is hostile to a democratic system to involve the judiciary in the politics of the people."). 78 Id. at 554. one vote" to Congressional districts, 84 popularly sanctioned malapportionment, 85 and local governments. 86 The Court's interjection into redistricting was not limited to malapportionment but extended into minority vote dilution under the Voting Rights Act 87 and then into constitutional racial gerrymandering. 88 In light of the Court's active role in such redistricting cases, it was unsurprising when the Court agreed to hear a redistricting dispute based on partisan gerrymandering.
In Davis v. Bandemer, the Court again asserted its authority to decide redistricting cases. 89 It maintained that partisan gerrymandering was justiciable under the equal protection clause and that extreme instances of partisan gerrymandering violated equal protection. A majority, however, failed to agree on a standard to discern such a violation. Justice White's plurality opinion sketched out an amorphous test that required discriminatory intent and a discriminatory impact that "consistently degrade Eighteen years later, the Court again took up partisan gerrymandering and in another deeply divided opinion, the plurality began by lamenting Bandemer's precedent: ''Throughout its subsequent history, Bandemer has served almost exclusively as an invitation to litigation without much prospect of redress.'' 93 While the entire Court affirmed the equal protection clause's prohibition of excessive partisan gerrymandering, a plurality maintained that such claims were nonjusticiable. The claims were not justiciable, according to the plurality, because "no judicially discernible and manageable standards exist by which political gerrymander cases are to be decided." 94 The plurality revisited Justice White's standard from Bandemer and decried the standard's obscurity, which it claimed was demonstrated by confusion among lower courts.
The four dissenting justices in Vieth explained that justiciability over partisan gerrymandering disputes were indeed justiciable, but could not agree on what the standard should be. The dissenters proposed three possible standards by which courts could determine constitutionality. 95 Justice Scalia, writing for the plurality, dedicated the bulk of the decision to dismantling these alternative standards and admonishing his colleagues that "judicial action must be governed by standard, by rule," before concluding that "no judicially discernible and manageable standards for adjudicating political gerrymandering claims have emerged." 96 Since no litigant or court ascertained a workable standard in the eighteen years separating Bandemer from Vieth, the plurality Id. at 278. 95 Id. at 317-68. Justice Stevens advocated for a standard targeting those instances "when partisanship is the legislature's sole motivation-when any pretense of neutrality is forsaken unabashedly and all traditional districting criteria are subverted for partisan advantage." Id. at 318. Justice Souter joined by Justice Ginsburg argued that a plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of partisan gerrymandering consisting of five elements. First, the plaintiff must be a member of a "cohesive political group, which would normally be a major party." Id. at 347. Second, the challenged map must have "paid little or no heed to…traditional districting principles…[such as] contiguity, compactness, respect for political subdivisions, and conformity with geographic features." Id. at 347-48. Third, there must be "specific correlations between [departures] from traditional districting principles and the distribution of the population of [the plaintiff's] group." Id. at 349. Fourth, an alternative map, complying with traditional districting principles must be feasible without diluting the voting strength of plaintiff's political group. Id. Fifth, claimants must show "the defendants acted intentionally to manipulate the shape of the district" to dilute the voting strength of the claimants' political group. Id. at 350. Finally, Justice Breyer proposed a continuum: The more entrenched the minority hold on power becomes, "the less evidence courts will need that the minority engaged in gerrymandering to achieve the desired result." Id. at 365. 96 Id. at 281.
concluded that no such standard existed and that such claims were therefore and henceforth non-justiciable. 97 Straddling the lacuna between plurality and dissent, Justice Kennedy agreed with the plurality that a manageable standard had not emerged yet, but disagreed with the plurality's conclusion that a manageable standard did not exist. "I would not foreclose all possibility of judicial relief if some limited and precise rationale were found to correct an established violation of the Constitution in some redistricting cases." 98 Divided in this way, Vieth presents a precedential purgatory. As a plurality opinion, it fails to overturn Bandemer's premise of justiciability. But until the Court sanctions a judicially discernable and manageable standard, Vieth effectively insulates partisan gerrymandering from constitutional scrutiny, especially when considering the unlikely emergence of a "precise" standard. 99 In one sense, the Vieth plurality has come full circle to Colgrove v. Green. The plurality in Vieth and the Court in Colgrove placed redistricting cases outside the judiciary's reach by characterizing such disputes as non-justiciable. But the Vieth plurality diverges from Colgrove in one critical aspect. Where the Colgrove Court held redistricting non-justiciable as a matter of constitutional mandate, 100 the Vieth plurality maintained that redistricting for partisan purposes was non-justiciable as a matter of judicial prudence. 101 Said differently, the Constitution provides that Congress has authority to ensure fair elections and a republican form of government, but it says nothing about the judiciary's obligation to fashion judicially manageable standards. 102
IV. Gerrymandering as Non-Justiciable
If it is true, as the Court has held for over three decades, that excessive partisan gerrymandering violates the equal protection 97 Id. at 306 ("Eighteen years of essentially pointless litigation have persuaded us that Bandemer is incapable of principled application. We would therefore overrule that case, and decline to adjudicate these political gerrymandering claims."). 98 Id. clause, 103 and if legislators refuse to self-correct, the Court's reluctance to address the problem due to its self-imposed asylum merits close scrutiny. 104 What is a judicially manageable standard? What test does the Court employ to determine whether a proposed standard is manageable? When and how has that test been used in other constitutional contexts?
A. Gerrymandering as a Political Question It is worth remembering that the political question doctrine, of which the requirement for a judicially manageable standard is a subset, 105 was a twin. The birth of judicial review also witnessed the birth of the political question doctrine, a doctrine that requires judicial abstention in instances inappropriate for judicial review. 106 Even as Chief Justice Marshall secured enormous judicial power, he simultaneously tempered its exercise.
The province of the court is, solely, to decide on the rights of individuals, not to inquire how the executive, or executive officers, perform duties in which they have a discretion. Questions in their nature political, or which are, by the constitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be made in this court. 107 From this foundation, the Court later constructed criteria from which to determine when coordinate branches of government retain sole authority to interpret and enforce particular constitutional provisions. Justice 103 See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 293 (reflecting a concession by the plurality that "excessive injection of politics [in districting] is unlawful. So it is, and so does our opinion assume"). 104 See Louis Henkin, Is There a "Political Question" Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597, 600 (1976) (maintaining that the artificial nature of the political question doctrine that excuses the judiciary from performing its core judicial function "cries for strict and skeptical scrutiny"). Marbury, 5 U.S. at 170 (ruling that the Court had the authority to review an act of Congress, and then declaring the portion of the Judiciary Act of 1789 giving the Court original jurisdiction over writs of mandamus unconstitutional under Article III of the Constitution).
Brennan, in Baker v. Carr, articulated the most frequently cited statement of these criteria:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question. 108 The potency of the political question doctrine lies in its finality. Once labeled a political question, the judiciary may not consider the underlying merits. 109 Discrete constitutional issues remain unanswered due to the Court's adherence to the political question doctrine. 110 Indeed, in several instances the Court seemingly identifies a constitutional violation, but nevertheless permits it, claiming an inability to redress the transgression. 111 The political question doctrine has excused the Court from considering whether a state's chartered government was a "republican form of government" under Art. IV, §4, 112 whether proposed constitutional amendments expire if unratified for too long, 113 
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See e.g., Vieth 541 U.S. at 293 (though refusing to address the merits of the case, conceding that "excessive injection of politics [in districting] is unlawful. So it is, and so does our opinion assume"); but see Skinner, supra note 106, at 428 (asserting that in nearly all political question cases, the Court essentially found that "the branch whose conduct was being challenged acted legally -in other words, within its constitutional or statutory powers").
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As noted above, the Court in Colgrove v. Green refused to correct malapportioned voting districts by characterizing reapportionment as a "political thicket" that courts must avoid and by finding that Congress had the sole authority to correct election impropriety under the Constitution. See supra Part III. whether an impeachment trial by Senate committee violates the constitution's provision allocating that power to "the Senate." 114 Lower courts apply the political question doctrine more frequently and in contexts not yet considered by the Supreme Court. The constitutionality of executive action committing troops into potential combat largely remains unaddressed by the Supreme Court, but lower courts have relied on the political question doctrine to avoid disputes stemming from the war in Vietnam 115 and U.S. military involvement in Nicaragua 116 and El Salvador. 117 More recently, district courts have used the political question doctrine to avoid merits review of cases involving environmental harms. 118 In one suit against major auto manufacturers, claimants sought redress for increased forest fires, disrupted water supply, and increased flood risk. 119 The district court dismissed the public nuisance suit citing no "manageable method of discerning the entities that are creating and contributing to the alleged nuisance. order of both importance and certainty." 122 Scholars have long divided the six criteria into two categories: classical and prudential. 123 Classical political questions are those in which the Constitution allocates decisionmaking authority to a coordinate branch. 124 It is rooted in commitment to separation of powers and limited judicial review. 125 When Judge Nixon claimed that his impeachment trial by Senate Committee violated the Constitution, the Court declined a merits ruling by relying on Article I: "The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments." 126 The Constitution, according to the Court, allocated decision-making regarding impeachment processes to Congress alone. 127 Prudential political questions, by contrast, "are [not] to be found in [the] Constitution." 128 They derive from a sense of prudence and austerity rather than from rule of law. The political question doctrine's requirement of a judicially manageable standard is a prudential one. 129 Although the requirement for a manageable standard could arguably be characterized as a classical political question when combined with other criteria, 130 the plurality's decision in Vieth that partisan gerrymandering is a political question rested solely on the lack of a manageable standard. 131 Notably, the Vieth plurality could not return to Colgrove's classical political question rationale -that the Constitution assigned Congress decision-making authority over the election process -without uprooting the Court's malapportionment and racial districting precedents. Id. at 265 (noting that commentators occasionally disagree about whether a particular holding is "prudential" or "classical," especially because political question holdings often rely on similar underlying justifications); see also Nixon, 506 U.S. at 228-29 (noting that "the lack of judicially manageable standards may strengthen the conclusion that there is a textually demonstrable commitment to a coordinate branch").
As a result, the Court's paralysis with partisan gerrymandering does not stem from the assignment of decision-making authority over redistricting to a coordinate branch. If it did, at least that coordinate branch would bear final responsibility for addressing the ills generated by partisan gerrymandering. Instead, the Court's paralysis reflects a deep-seated insecurity regarding the appropriate exercise of the judicial function. The Vieth plurality said as much, stating that an unclear courtmade standard was not worth "the enmity it brings upon the courts." 133 The plurality went on to suggest that the legislative branch is better suited to devise such a standard. "Laws promulgated by the Legislative Branch can be inconsistent, illogical, and ad hoc; law pronounced by the courts must be principled, rational, and based upon reasoned distinctions." 134 This statement, in a gerrymandering case, carries some irony. The legislative branch propagates gerrymandering. The problem is one of its making. In 241 years, legislators have showed little willingness to address gerrymandering's ills and a great appetite to expand and entrench its influence, 135 making the Court's exhortation that the legislature is better suited to address gerrymandering issues inapposite.
Notably, legal theory justifying the political question doctrine parallels the distinction between classical and prudential. 136 Classical political questions are bound by law; textual commitments of decisionmaking authority to a coordinate branch require judicial abstention. 137 As a result, justification for abstention derives from the text and structure of the Constitution itself. 138 Concentration of power in any one branch or official invites authoritarianism and undermines representative democracy. 139 The Court has historically parroted this basic tenet of American democracy in its landmark decisions, and the rationale supporting classical political questions surfaces in the most prominent political question cases. 140 133 Vieth, 541 U.S. at 301. 134 Id. at 278. 135 See supra Part III. 136 See supra note 123. 137 See id. 138 Wechsler, supra note 123, at 7-8. 139 Although the separation of powers justification for the political doctrine appears unassailable at first blush, Professors Redish and Henkin, among others, have forwarded strong arguments for the abolition of the political question doctrine altogether, including classical political questions. Henkin, supra note 104, at 600; Redish, supra note 121, at 1031-33. Justifications for prudential political questions are more practical. 141 They are necessarily distinct from the text of the Constitution and are grounded instead on "theories of normative policy." 142 Judicial abdication based on prudence is justified by the following:
(1) the inability of the judiciary to develop general principles and rules of construction of a particular constitutional provision; (2) the judiciary's lack of institutional capacity to review particular judgments of one or both of the political branches; and (3) the judicial humility that flows from the judiciary's inherently undemocratic nature… [(4)] the fear that the judiciary's authority and legitimacy will be undermined by a blatant disregard of its decision by the political branches. 143 Each justification listed above has received significant scholarly attention. 144 It is not the aim of this Article to recount what others already have done so well. Instead, a precise study of the political question doctrine as applied to partisan gerrymandering reveals that the Court's reticence to decide such disputes is unsupported by the underlying rationales that animate prudential political questions.
C. Gerrymandering as Lacking a Judicially Manageable Standard
It is worth repeating that the Vieth Court refused review based on one of six Baker criteria. 145 The Court did not hold that the Guarantee Id. at 1043-44 (synthesizing Professor Bickel's characterization of the most prominent rationales for the political question doctrine). 144 See e.g., Barkow, supra note 102, at 244; Henkin, supra note 104, at 600; Redish, supra note 121, at 1034-35. 145 Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 306 (2004) ; see also Stillman, supra note 131, at 1299 ("What makes Vieth's use of the [prudential political question doctrine] unique, at least in the post-Baker [political question doctrine] era, is that it relied on the lack of judicially discernible and manageable standards as an independently sufficient rationale for rendering a [political question doctrine] holding, without any genuine argument that the issue was textually committed to a coordinate federal branch.").
Clause or Article I §4 provided grounds to withhold review. As such, the underlying justification supporting classical political questions is inapplicable. 146 Instead, the Court solely relied a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards. Standing alone, the manageable standard requirement is prudential. 147 It is not imposed by law, but by the Court itself. 148 It is more guideline than mandate, and consequently the Court can choose to disregard it without legal infraction. 149 But before analyzing when the Court chooses to adhere to the manageable standard requirement, the requirement must first be defined. What is a judicially manageable standard? constitutional provisions like equal protection and due process. 154 Within the context of gerrymandering, for example, the Court unanimously agreed that egregious cases violate equal protection. 155 But that constitutional assurance, standing alone, does not necessitate justiciability: "The issue we have discussed is not whether severe partisan gerrymanders violate the Constitution, but whether it is for the courts to say when a violation has occurred, and to design a remedy." 156 Second, the Court's practice of devising standards that enforce constitutional norms presents no obstacle. 157 The equal protection clause, itself, is not a judicially manageable standard. 158 A judicially designed standard is needed to implement equal protection's promise. Almost every Justice in Vieth strove to articulate a workable standard or demonstrate why a proposed standard was unworkable. 159 None attacked the underlying premise, that the judicial function includes authority to design workable standards in the first place. 160 Third, the standard fabricated by the Court need not precisely reflect constitutional meaning. 161 The Vieth Court pursued a "workable" formulation, one that hewed to the spirit of equal protection's promise without having to replicate it exactly. 162 This, of course, implies that the Court tolerates, even expects, a lacuna between constitutional guarantees and the court-made standards devised to implement them. As Professor Fallon suggests, "close is good enough, too much disparity will not do." 163 While valuable in many ways, these insights fail to unveil how the Court determines whether a given standard is manageable, or "close enough." The equal protection clause says nothing, for example, about a compelling government interest required before government action targets certain groups. 164 It says nothing about redistricting based on race as a predominate factor, 165 or the necessity for clear guidance in 154 See id. at 1281-82. 155 Vieth, 541 U.S. at 293. 156 Id. at 292. 157 See Fallon, supra note 151, at 1281-84. 158 See id. at 1283.
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Vieth, 541 U.S. at 292-368. 160 See id. 161 See Fallon, supra note 151, at 1281-84. 162 Vieth, 541 U.S. at 292-368. 163 See Fallon, supra note 151, at 1284. determining voter intent when counting ballots. 166 Yet, in each instance, the Court used the relatively elastic equal protection clause to fashion manageable standards that deviate in various degrees from the meaning of the clause itself. 167 Of course, this practice is not limited to the equal protection clause. A wide array of decisions contain meaningful gaps between constitutional text and court-made standard. Whether personal jurisdiction, 168 establishment of religion, 169 or obscenity, 170 the Court has historically confronted textual ambiguity with judicially designed standards that either over-enforce or under-enforce constitutional meaning. 171 These many instances demonstrate that no uniform standard guides the Court when it delineates manageable from unmanageable. 172 According to some scholars, the standard used by the Court to determine manageability is itself unmanageable: "[T]he Court makes its judgements about whether proposed standards count as judicially manageable under criteria that would themselves fail to qualify as judicially manageable…". 173 While it is tempting to conclude that the Court's illusory process for determination of manageability renders efforts to understand the requirement futile, 174 some solace can be found in a baseline requirement of intelligibility in conjunction with additive practical factors. In other words, to be manageable the standard must be understandable at The rationale for discovering a test under one provision but not the other has little bearing on the court-made standard itself. See Redish, supra note 121, at 1047 (identifying a range of court-made standards before suggesting that "one must suspect the disingenuousness of the 'absence-of-standards' rationale"). 173 See e.g., Fallon, supra note 151, at 1278. 174 Redish, supra note 121, at 1047 ("Ultimately, any constitutional provision can be supplied with working standards of interpretation.").
minimum. As Justice Scalia puts it, unintelligibility is akin to "judging whether a particular line is longer than a particular rock is heavy." 175 It then helps if the standard is practical in the sense that it will likely lead to fairly consistent results 176 as well as results that are actionable. 177 Judicial competence, the ability of the court to fully comprehend the facts of certain cases as well as the predictability of results stemming from judicial intervention, are implicit within this consideration. 178 Lower courts, for example, often avoid the merits of cases involving foreign affairs citing lack of expertise. 179 Similarly, a standard that generates predictable and consistent results is more likely to be manageable. As Justice Scalia opined in Vieth, "Some criterion more solid and more demonstrably met than [fairness] seems to us necessary to enable the state legislatures to discern the limits of their districting discretion [and] to meaningfully constrain the discretion of the courts." 180 While these baseline factors are helpful they have not been consistently followed and are not themselves determinative. 181 The Vieth Court, for example, rebuked Justice Powell's purported "fairness" standard for gerrymandering disputes even though fairness and justness See Fallon, supra note 151, at 1291-92. 178 See e.g., U.S. v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 274-75 (1946) ("It seems certain, however, the courts do not possess the techniques or the personnel to consider and act upon the complex combinations of factors entering into the problems…") (J. Black, dissenting). 179 See, e.g., Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307, 1310 (2d Cir. 1973) (avoiding the merits of dispute involving military action in Cambodian by claiming a nonjusticiable political question because the dispute raised "precisely the questions of fact involving military and diplomatic expertise not vested in the judiciary"); DaCosta v. Laird, 471 F.2d 1146, 1155 (2d Cir. 1973) ("Judges, deficient in military knowledge, lacking vital information upon which to assess the nature of battlefield decisions, and sitting thousands of miles from the field of action, cannot reasonably or appropriately determine whether a specific military operation constitutes an 'escalation' of the war or is merely a new tactical approach within a continuing strategic plan."); U.S. v. Sisson, 294 F. Supp. 515, 517-18 (D. Mass. 1968) (avoiding merits review of claims regarding the legality of military tactics in Vietnam because a "domestic tribunal is incapable of eliciting the facts during a war, and because it is probably incapable of exercising a disinterested judgment which would command the confidence of sound judicial opinion").
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Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 291 (2004) . These practical considerations are balanced against the fact that a standard, by definition, entails more flexibility than a rule, which is a rigid and determinate formulation. The more flexible the standard, the more judgement and discretion required, carrying the concomitant risk of inconsistent results. See Fallon, supra note 151, at 1286. 181 See Fallon, supra note 151, at 1293-94. (claiming unanswerable questions regarding "how much analytical bite, or how much predictability or consistency of judicial decisionmaking" is required).
play prominent parts in other constitutional standards. 182 Indeed, constitutional jurisprudence teems with standards that lack administrative facility and ready redress, including balancing tests, 183 state-of-mind probes, 184 and totality of the circumstances inquiries. 185 In one due process context, constitutionality turns on whether one's conscience has been shocked. 186 These examples illustrate that any constitutional provision, regardless of opacity, can be outfitted with a court-made standard. As Professor Redish notes, "those standards often will not clearly flow from either the language or history of the provision, but that fact does not distinguish them from many judicial standards invoked every day. See, e.g., Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297-98 (1991) (explaining that "the offending conduct must be wanton"); Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 398 (1989) (stating that "the terms 'cruel' and 'punishment' clearly suggest some inquiry into subjective state of mind"); id. at 397 (explaining that Johnson's substantive due process standard puts the defendant's subjective motivation in issue); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986) (finding that "the Due Process Clause is simply not implicated by a negligent act of an official causing unintended loss of or injury to life, liberty, or property"); see also Howard M. Wasserman, Iqbal, Procedural Mismatches, and Civil Rights Litigation, 14 LEWIS AND CLARK L. REV. 157 (2010) (citing difficulty pleading factually plausible claims where constitutionality turns on defendant officials' subjective state of mind). 185 See e.g., Fallon, supra note 151, at 1289 n.57 (collecting numerous totality of circumstances cases). the Court often employs a generalized cost-benefit analysis. 188 Is the cost of reduced judicial legitimacy outweighed by the benefit achieved through an unwieldy judicial standard? This cost-benefit overlay to manageability pervades Vieth. The dissenters did not argue that their proposed standards perfectly fit the constitutional guarantee; the dissenters argued that their proposed standards were better than the status quo. 189 Imperfect enforcement outweighs no enforcement at all. Justice Scalia's plurality, perhaps surprisingly, also reduced the manageability analysis to a generalized balancing of the perceived benefit attending the adoption of an imperfect standard against the perceived detriment of reduced judicial legitimacy.
Is the regular insertion of the judiciary into districting, with the delay and uncertainty that it brings to the political process and the partisan . . . enmity it brings upon the courts, worth the benefit to be achieved-an accelerated (by some unknown degree) effectuation of the majority will? We think not. 190 Perhaps Justice Scalia cribbed this balancing test -manageability balanced against the Court's reputation -from Baker v. Carr in which Justices Frankfurter and Harlan dissented from court intervention in malapportionment disputes. 191 "Those who consider that continuing national respect for the Court's authority depends in large measure upon its wise exercise of self-restraint and discipline in constitutional adjudication, will view the decision with deep concern." 192 Or, perhaps Justice Scalia's balancing test hailed from the Court's refusal to interpret impeachment processes, wherein the Court admonished that "opening the door of judicial review…would 'expose the political life of the country to months, or perhaps years, of chaos. '" 193 In fact, Justice Scalia could have drawn inspiration for the balancing test from a well-spring of judicial precedent in which the Court declined review to foster institutional legitimacy. 194 As shown above, judicial restraint in the 188 See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 301 (2004) ; Nixon v. U.S., 506 U.S. 224, 236 (1993) ; see also Fallon, supra note 151, at 1278, 1294-95 ("In making this ultimate judgment, the Court, willy-nilly, conducts a startlingly open-ended inquiry in which, among other things, it weighs the costs and benefits of adjudicating pursuant to particular proposed standards.). 189 See supra note 95. Id. at 340 (Harlan, J., dissenting). service of judicial legitimacy is a principal rationale for the political question doctrine itself. Viewed through this lens, the manageable standard roadblock reflects a deeper, historical insecurity involving appropriateness of judicial review.
V. Judicial Legitimacy and Representational Democracy
Condensing the foregoing analysis is helpful. The Court has exercised, without serious question, its authority to devise standards that seek to implement constitutional norms. The Court has accepted a certain degree of deviation when court-made standards fail to capture constitutional norms perfectly. Such deviation cannot be "too great," although no consistent test has emerged by which the Court determines whether a standard deviates too much and is therefore unmanageable. At bottom, the standard must be intelligible. And, though not determinative, the standard's practical effects like predictability and ease of implementation have played a part in manageability decisions. Most importantly, the Court often enmeshes manageability with judicial review and related concerns of judicial legitimacy. 195 This preoccupation with judicial legitimacy is as old as the Court. 196 Assuming that the Court's concern is valid and that protecting its reputation justifies abdication in certain instances, this Article argues that gerrymandering is not one of them, and that the judiciary validly intervenes when it acts to ensure representational democracy's proper functioning. Correcting artificial obstructions that truncate or unduly dilute popular sovereignty is value-neutral and well within the judiciary's expertise. By contrast, judicial interjection that constitutionally enshrines one substantive value over another necessarily implicates the bias of a non-elected Court and has historically proved problematic.
A. Constitution as Form and Process
The form and structure of the constitution support judicial review of disputes that challenge obstructions to representative democracy. Neophytes, upon first reading the Constitution, are often surprised that the document, particularly before amendment, resembles a sterile recitation of compartmental design: which branch and which official has authority to do which thing. The few substantive rights in the body of the document are enfolded into larger prescriptions that allocate political 195 See supra Part IV(c). 196 See BICKEL, supra note 34, at 24.
power and ensure constituent participation in government. 197 Prohibitions against bills of attainder, titles of nobility, and corruption of blood do little to burnish the constitution's reputation as repository of individual liberties. 198 Said differently, the constitution primarily separates powers and outlines processes for effective governance by the people. 199 Even the substantive rights clauses, like Ex Post Facto and Bills of Attainder can be viewed as performing separation-of-powers functions. 200 The Constitution -and by extension, judicial reviewprincipally focuses on structure and process in a representational government of separated powers. 201 The amendments, while somewhat more concerned with individual liberties, are certainly not singularly so. Most of the amendments are either procedural in function or identify a substantive right that itself facilitates governmental processes. 202 The first amendment, for example, guards against government overreach by protecting political discourse. 203 It serves a structural purpose as much as an individualized one. 204 The fourth amendment combines an individual privacy right with procedural protections by suppressing evidence seized from illegal searches. 205 "Amendments five through eight," as Professor Ely notes, "tend to become relevant only during lawsuits, and we have tended to think of them as procedural…, calculated to enhance the fairness and efficiency of the litigation process." 206 The amendments added after 1868 largely expand democratic participation through voting, whether based on race, 207 gender, 208 Id. at 89. ("The theme that justice and happiness are best assured not by trying to define them for all time, but rather by attending to the governmental processes by which their dimensions would be specified over time, carried over into our critical constitutional documents."). slavery in the body of the constitution illustrates a substantive right remedied only at a horrific price. 212 Temperance, also enshrined as a substantive right, produced upheaval before constitutionally erased through the twenty-first amendment. 213 Some argue the substantive right to possess guns fits the same pattern. 214 The Constitution is a poor vehicle for cementing popular value judgments, which tend to evolve with society. 215 But governmental structure and prescribed processes designed to ensure participation in representational government properly embody the constitution's highest and best function. 216 The Constitution's form and structure demonstrate the framers' intent to protect fundamental concepts of freedom and liberty primarily though democratic processes. Requiring elections of Representatives every two years and expressly naming the federal government as guardian against electoral manipulation, are textual proof of that commitment. 217 Significant debate at the Constitutional Convention in 1787 turned on insulating the essential processes of government from manipulation so that the House of Representatives, for example, actually reflected the electorate and were accountable to it. 218 The Framers were responding to the lack representation afforded them as colonists in conjunction with fresh memory of rotten boroughs that corrupted England's representative system. 219 North Carolina delegate, John Steele, argued that the Constitution would not permit the creation of rotten boroughs, and that if redistricting plans that corrupted representation were passed that were "inconsistent 
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See ELY, supra note 200, at 94. 215 See id. at 88 (explaining that "the few attempts the various framers have made to freeze substantive values by designating them for special protection in the document have been ill-fated, normally resulting in repeal, either officially or by interpretive pretense"). 216 See id. 217 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, at 227 (James Madison) ("The genius of republican liberty seems to demand on one side, not only that all power should be derived from the people, but that those intrusted with it should be kept in dependence on the people by a short duration of their appointments…"). with the Constitution, independent judges will not uphold them..." 220 Delegate Steele was not alone in characterizing the Constitution's role as both creating and protecting the representational process. The only time George Washington addressed the constitutional convention on a substantive issue, he did so in an effort to increase the degree in which elected representatives reflected their constituents. 221 George Mason claimed that "[r]eps. should sympathize with their constituents; shd. think as they think, & feel as they feel." 222 John Adams wrote that the representative assembly "should be in miniature, an exact portrait of the people at large. It should think, feel, reason, and act like them." 223 Perhaps James Madison was the most ardent defender of protecting democratic processes through unimpeded representation. In The Federalist No. 52, Madison wrote that "it is particularly essential that the [House of Representatives] should have an immediate dependence on, and an intimate sympathy with the people." 224 Madison explicitly referred to state legislatures and the temptation "to mould their regulations as to favor the candidates they wished to succeed." 225 Madison understood that elected officials would attempt to retain power by obstructing the democratic machinery that allows power to change hands:
[T]he State Legislatures will sometimes fail or refuse to consult the common interest at the expense of their local conveniency or prejudices. . . . [T] he Legislatures of the States ought not to have the uncontrolled right of regulating the times places & manner of holding elections. . . . It was impossible to foresee all the abuses that might be made of the discretionary power. 226 The Constitution's concern, and therefore (arguably) the Court's concern, turns on procedural protections ensuring unhindered participation in self-governance. The document's form and structure memorialize this central focus of the Framers' intent.
B. Judicial Intervention to Facilitate Representational Democracy 220
The Court has historically exercised judicial review to facilitate democratic participation and to remove artificial barriers that obstruct fair processes and insulate elected representatives from public accountability. The most famous footnote in constitutional jurisprudence identified instances that merit "more searching judicial inquiry." 227 Footnote four in Carolene Products is deservedly famous for identifying "discrete and insular minorities" as worthy of heightened judicial scrutiny in the face of majoritarian discrimination. 228 But to so limit the footnote's interpretation is to overlook a critically important point. The footnote not only calls for court intervention but also calls for exacting court scrutiny in order to ensure the proper working of democratic government. 229 Specifically, it requires "more exacting scrutiny" when "legislation restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation." 230 This language very nearly defines partisan gerrymandering, a legislative restriction that obstructs the political process by pre-determining election results. 231 Even the footnote's protection of discrete and insular minorities is couched in terms of the court's role in protecting the democratic process by highlighting prejudice "which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities…". 232 This representation-reinforcing approach to judicial review suggests the propriety, even obligation, of judicial engagement in partisan redistricting. The Court has certainly engaged in other contexts aimed at facilitating representative and participatory functions of democratic governance. First Amendment free expression jurisprudence, for example, illustrates court intervention to facilitate democratic processes just as much as to protect individual rights. The amendment's language focuses on limiting government authority: "Congress shall make no law…abridging the freedom speech, of the press; or the right of the people peaceable to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." 233 open discussion meant to check government overreach. 234 Of course, nonpolitical speech finds protection here, too, but the protection's robust scope partly derives from ensuring effective democratic functioning. 235 More germane to gerrymandering, the Court's involvement in voting disputes confirms appropriateness of judicial review to ensure proper functioning of democratic processes. In the aggregate, the Court's voting decisions make clear that the constitution protects the right to vote in both federal and state elections: "A consistent line of decisions by this Court in cases involving attempts to deny or restrict the right of suffrage has made this indelibly clear." 236 The Court has intervened to assert constitutional protection for the right to vote, 237 to have votes counted 238 and not diluted by ballot box stuffing. 239 The Court has intervened to scrutinize restrictions on the right to vote, including poll taxes, 240 literacy tests, 241 property ownership, 242 and photographic identification. 243 The Court has interposed its judgement by requiring that states provide absentee ballots to those who are incarcerated and awaiting trial. 244 Closer still to partisan redistricting, the Court has intervened to invalidate racial gerrymandering 245 and white primaries. 246 But the Court's decisions in malapportionment redistricting represent the closest analogue to partisan gerrymandering. 247 The question of court intervention in malapportionment cases was not an easy one. Passionate disagreement over whether it was proper for the Court to intervene, prompted the Court, in Baker v. Carr, to request that the litigants re-argue the case, 248 with one Justice so conflicted that he recused himself due to illness. 249 The Court's ultimate determination that it properly exercised judicial authority in reviewing malapportionment claims and that Tennessee's malapportionment impermissibly diluted voting under the equal protection clause, had a wide and continuing impact. 250 Tennessee was not the only state forced to re-draw district lines; the controversial ruling affected nearly every state in the union. 251 Chief Justice Earl Warren characterized this case as the most significant of his tenure. 252 The Court partially explained the importance of its ruling in a later opinion: "The right to vote freely for the candidate of one's choice is of the essence of a democratic society, and any restrictions on that right strike at the heart of representative government." 253 In a series of cases following Baker v. Carr, the Court repeatedly emphasized the propriety of Court intervention to ensure proper democratic functioning. The Court stressed, for example, that "the right of suffrage is a fundamental matter in a free and democratic society," and that "any infringement of the right of citizens to vote must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized." 254 In another malapportionment case, the Court again couched its justification for intervention in terms of democratic government. "To say that a vote is worth more in one district than in another would…run counter to our fundamental ideas of democratic government…". 255 When admonished that state governments are better suited than the Court to address irregularities in voting district population, that judicial intervention diminishes legislative prerogative, and that a "political thicket" and a "mathematical quagmire" would surely attend judicial intervention, the Court gave a succinct response. "Our answer is this: a denial of constitutionally protected rights demands judicial protection; our oath and our office require no less of us." 256 The logic and rationale bolstering judicial review in malapportionment disputes applies with equal force to partisan gerrymandering. Indeed, Court intervention in gerrymandering disputes is arguably more appropriate. Legislators intentionally dilute voting equality in gerrymandering disputes, whereas malapportionment arises innocently as people migrate from rural to urban districts. In both, the avenues normally available to effect change in democratic governance are constricted.
As noted above, the Court has not acted to clear these avenues but has abstained for three decades citing a lack of a judicially manageable standard. The precedential purgatory imposed by Vieth remains the law of the land. Because Justice Kennedy, as the fifth vote, rejected the dissent's three proposed standards as unworkable but maintained the possibility that a workable standard would someday emerge, enormous efforts to contrive a suitable standard followed. 257 In Whitford v. Gill the Court will appraise a new proposed standard to determine its manageability and in doing so, the propriety of judicial review.
C. Judicial Intervention to Facilitate Representational Democracy in Whitford v. Gill
The claimants in Whitford proposed a new manageable standard dubbed the "efficiency gap," which measures the difference between the parties' wasted votes. 258 Votes cast for a losing candidate are deemed "wasted" as are votes in excess of what the winning candidate needed to prevail. 259 Gerrymandering generates substantial "inefficiencies" by packing favorable votes into a single district and by cracking other districts, resulting in large numbers of losing votes. 260 The efficiency gap combines the wasted votes from all districts, reducing the inefficiencies to a single percentage. 261 Importantly, this measurement also reveals entrenchment. States that have efficiency gaps of at least 7% will yield substantially similar election results year over year despite plausible shifts in voter preference. 262 The efficiency gap, as a result, identifies gerrymanders "that are both severe and entrenched." 263 The trial court in Whitford did not solely rely on the efficiency gap as the definitive standard, but used the measurement when applying a three-pronged test. 264 The court's test analyzed whether redistricting "(1)
[was] intended to place a severe impediment on the effectiveness of the votes of individual citizens on the basis of their political affiliation, (2) has 257 See Stillman, supra note 131, at 1318-21 (suggesting that Justice Kennedy's concurrence is an invitation to propose new standards that "cannot help but invite more litigation"). that effect, and (3) cannot be justified on other, legitimate legislative grounds." 265 The efficiency gap informed the second prong of the test by showing that Wisconsin's map would have ensured Republican advantage through the lifetime of the map. 266 The ability to measure such entrenchment allowed the court to distinguish inherent from invidious discrimination, a distinction critical to equal protection analysis. 267 The Supreme Court has accepted review and will surely scrutinize the efficiency gap and the trial court's test to determine whether they are manageable standards. If the Court again abstains, partisan gerrymandering will likely intensify. Arguments favoring abstention characterize the efficiency gap as unmanageable. 268 The standard, it is argued, cannot perfectly account for shifting voter preferences, which potentially dilutes entrenchment. 269 If shifting voter preferences diffuse the gerrymander's effect, the redistricting occasions no harm. Another criticism of the efficiency gap derives from Justice Kennedy's concern of determining "how much partisan dominance is too much." 270 The efficiency gap attempts to address that concern by identifying the level of inefficiency that yields entrenchment. 271 But this standard is itself imprecise. The trial court found a 7% gap presumptively violative; the authors of the efficiency gap model posit that an 8% gap is presumptively violative. 272 As noted above, however, the standard need not perfectly implement the constitution's meaning. Constitutional jurisprudence overflows with imprecise standards. 273 Again, malapportionment serves as the closest analogue. The malapportionment standard, one person one vote, was lauded for its ease of administration, its manageability. 274 But a closer study reveals instances where strict adherence to the standard was impracticable. 275 As a result, the Court recalibrated the standard, holding redistricting presumptively unlawful when population deviations exceed 10%. 276 Presumptive invalidity of 10% in malapportionment cases is not dissimilar from presumptive invalidity of 7% in gerrymandering cases. The efficiency gap does not perfectly reflect equal protection's promise, but it isn't required to do so.
VI. Conclusion
Whitford v. Gill presents an opportunity to look more closely at the Court's past refusal to decide gerrymandering disputes. The political question doctrine, and more particularly, the prudential requirement that the Court abstain if it lacks a judicially manageable standard, has heretofore stopped the Court from identifying those gerrymanders that violate equal protection. But an analysis of the manageable standard requirement reveals the Court's failure to define what a manageable standard is. More disconcerting, the Court has applied the manageable standard requirement haphazardly, illustrated by scores of court-made standards that either over-or under-enforce the constitutional norm they purport to implement. Why is "fairness" a manageable standard in some contexts but not others? How are standards that measure one's shocked conscious, or weigh the totality of the circumstances judicially manageable?
While a review of the Court's application of the manageability requirement yields few insights, one common thread connects the Court's use of the manageability requirement to its insecurity in exercising judicial review, indicating that the Court often applies the manageability requirement when particularly insecure in exercising the judicial function. Recast in this light, the question of Court engagement in gerrymandering disputes turns on the propriety of Court intervention to address artificial obstacles that disrupt democratic functionality, a question squarely within the judicial role. The Constitution as a whole, in structure and form, demonstrates the document's principal aim of ensuring representational democracy through prescribed processes. The relatively few provisions in the Constitution that memorialize substantive rights are sporadic and enfolded into the broader constitutional design that details democratic processes.
The Court's jurisprudence also favors intervention. In analogous contexts, the Court has identified manageable standards in disputes involving artificial obstacles to proper democratic functioning. Whether impediments to voting, malapportionment, or racial gerrymandering, the Court consistently and appropriately intervenes to protect popular sovereignty and to ensure that those in power cannot insulate themselves by fabricating barriers to democratic processes.
Court intervention is warranted. The Framers contemplated the Court's role to include correcting artificial strictures on representational democracy, the Court has historically and successfully done so, and adequate judicial tools exist to measure and censure harmful partisan gerrymandering. One of the Court's central responsibilities is to protect democratic governance. The Court has recognized as much historically. It should do so again in Whitford.
